

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0285

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: PROBLEM OF PHASE II REDUCTION

COMMITMENTS

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE AD HOC GROUP JUNE 16 REPORT
TO NAC (MBFR VIENNA 276) DESCRIBES THE SITUATION
WHICH HAS ARisen IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AS A RESULT OF
EASTERN QUESTIONS ON WHETHER NON-US WESTERN DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS WOULD UNDERTAKE INDIVIDUAL REDUCTION
OBLIGATIONS IN PHASE II OF THE WESTERN APPROACH.
THE AD HOC GROUP REPORT REQUESTS GUIDANCE ON HOW TO
DEAL WITH THIS QUESTION, AND SUGGESTS SEVERAL APPROACHES.
BECAUSE VIEWS SHARPLY DIVERGED TO THE BEST COURSE,

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THE AD HOC GROUP MAKES NO RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NAC.

2. THIS MESSAGE RECOMMENDS THAT

WASHINGTON SUPPORT ALTERNATIVE C (PARA 16C OF MBFR VIENNA 276). WE BELIEVE IT IS DESIRABLE TO RECEIVE NEW NAC GUIDANCE CLARIFYING THE ALLIED POSITION ON THIS QUESTION DURING THE CURRENT ROUND. WITHOUT SUCH GUIDANCE, WE BELIEVE ALLIES WILL NOT BE IN A POSITION EFFECTIVELY TO PRESS THEIR PHASING CONCEPT WITH THE EAST. END SUMMARY.

3. THE AD HOC GROUP REPORT OUTLINES FOUR COURSES. THE FIRST COURSE (PARA 15 (-) OF MBFR VIENNA 276) IS TO LEAVE THE WESTERN POSITION AS IT WAS EXPLAINED TO THE EAST IN THE JUNE 10 INFORMAL SESSION. THIS MEANS REFUSING TO DISCUSS THE NATURE OF THE REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS WHICH THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD UNDERTAKE IN PHASE II.

4. THIS COURSE HAS NO SUPPORT IN THE AD HOC GROUP. ITS DISADVANTAGES ARE OUTLINED IN GENERAL TERMS IN PARA 13 OF THE AD HOC GROUP REPORT. THE BASIC REASON WHY THIS IS NOT A EFFECTIVE COURSE IS THAT THE ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES HAVE ALREADY, IN THE JUNE 3 INFORMAL SESSION, TAKEN A POSITION ON THE NATURE OF THE REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS TO BE ASSUMED BY THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN PHASE II: NAMELY, THAT THESE OBLIGATIONS WOULD BE COLLECTIVE IN NATURE. THIS POSITION WAS REJECTED BY THE EAST. THE POSITION TAKEN IN THE JUNE 10 INFORMAL PROVIDES NO ANSWER AS TO WHETHER THE STATEMENTS MADE ON JUNE 3 DO OR DO NOT REPRESENT THE ALLIED POSITION.

5. AT THE JUNE 3 SESSION, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES POINTED OUT THAT THE EAST HAD ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS FREQUENTLY ASKED WHEN NON-US WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS ON THE AMOUNT OF THEIR REDUCTIONS. THEY RECALLED THAT WESTERN REPS HAD SAID THAT SUCH COMMITMENTS WOULD ONLY BE UNDERTAKEN IN PHASE II. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES SAID THAT THESE

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RESPONSES HAD LED THEM TO BELIEVE THAT, IN PHASE II, EACH NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANT WOULD UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL COMMITMENTS ON THE AMOUNT AND TIMING OF ITS REDUCTIONS. THEY STATED THAT THE FRG REP'S REMARKS ON JUNE 3 LED THEM TO CONCLUDE THAT THE WEST HAD NOW RETREATED FROM THIS EARLIER POSITION.

6. COMMENT: THE EASTERN INTERPRETATION IS A REASON-

ABLE ONE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE NEVER GIVEN DETAILS OR EXPLICITLY STATED THAT PHASE II REDUCTION COMMITMENTS BY NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE INDIVIDUAL. HOWEVER, THE CLEAR IMPLICATION OF WESTERN RESPONSES OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS AND OUR OWN UNDERSTANDING OF THEM WAS THAT PROVIDED THE ISSUE OF THE COLLECTIVE CEILING WAS SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED, THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD OBLIGATE THEMSELVES INDIVIDUALLY AS TO PRECISE REDUCTION FIGURES FOR EACH WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANT IN PHASE II.

7. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS NOT FEASIBLE FOR THE ALLIES TO PROCEED AS IF THE EXCHANGES DESCRIBED ABOVE HAD NEVER TAKEN PLACE, BY RETREATING INTO THE POSITION THAT THEY WILL NOT NOW DISCUSS THE NATURE OF PHASE II REDUCTION COMMITMENTS. UNLESS THE WESTERN POSITION IS CLARIFIED, THE ALLIES WILL BE OBLIGED TO TAKE A PASSIVE, DEFENSIVE POSITION ON PHASING, LEAVING THE FIELD TO THE EAST TO PRESS ITS VIEW THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD UNDERTAKE INDIVIDUAL REDUCTION COMMITMENTS FROM THE OUTSET.

8. PHASING IS A MAJOR US OBJECTIVE. IF THE ALLIES DO NOT CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR THEIR PHASING CONCEPT, AND ARE UNABLE EFFECTIVELY TO ATTACK THE EASTERN POSITION THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD UNDERTAKE INDIVIDUAL REDUCTION COMMITMENTS FROM THE OUTSET, THE EASTERN LEADERSHIP MAY CONCLUDE THAT THE WEST IS NOT SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN ITS PHASING CONCEPT AND CAN BE BROUGHT AROUND TO THE EASTERN POSITION THAT EACH PARTICIPANT SHOULD COMMIT ITSELF FROM THE OUTSET. THE EASTERN POSITION MAY HARDEN AS A RESULT.

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9. MOREOVER, FRG REPS RE RELIES DURING THE JUNE 3 INFORMAL SESSION HAVE SERVED TO INTENSIFY EASTERN SUSPICIONS THAT THE WEST EUROPEANS AND PARTICULARLY THE FRG ARE SEEKING TO AVOID ANY CONCRETE OR SUB-STATIONAL COMMITMENTS IN MBFR. THE EAST WILL NOW INSIST ALL THE MORE THAT THESE PARTICIPANTS UNDERTAKE CONCRETE INDIVIDUAL REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS FROM THE OUTSET, SO THAT THE USSR WILL NOT RISK BEING CHEATED OF ONE OF ITS PRIME MBFR GOALS IN PHASE II. WE BELIEVE THEREFORE THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO SEEK TO REPAIR THE DAMAGE THAT HAS BEEN DONE TO THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ALLIED POSITION ON PHASING BY MODIFYING THE PRESENT ALLIED POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE EAST, DURING THE CURRENT NEGOTIATING ROUND, BEFORE THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS

RETURN TO MOSCOW. IF IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO GAIN ALLIED AGREEMENT TO DO THIS, THEN IT SHOULD BE DONE AT THE LATEST IN CONJUNCTION WITH PUTTING FORWARD OPTION III SO THAT OPTION III DOES NOT HAVE TO CARRY THE ADDITIONAL LOAD OF A WEAK WESTERN POSITION ON PHASING.

10. PARA 16 OF THE AD HOC GROUP REPORT (MBFR VIENNA 276) OUTLINES THREE POSSIBLE WAYS OF DOING THIS. THE

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

FIRST COURSE (PARA 16A) WOULD IN EFFECT CONFIRM THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE FRG REP DURING THE JUNE 3 INFORMAL SESSION: WESTERN REDUCTION COMMITMENTS WOULD BE COLLECTIVE IN NATURE, AND THE EAST WOULD BE INFORMED OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF REDUCTIONS AMONG WESTERN PARTICIPANTS ONLY AFTER THE AGREEMENT HAD ENTERED INTO EFFECT. THE EAST WOULD NOT BE IN A POSITION TO BARGAIN

ON THE SIZE OF THE REDUCTION BY EACH WESTERN PARTICIPANT.

11. THIS ALTERNATIVE HAS APPARENTLY BEEN BONN'S PREFERRED COURSE HERETOFORE. THE FRG REPRESENTATIVE ADMITTED IN THE JUNE 4 AD HOC GROUP MEETING THAT HE HAD GONE BEYOND EXISITING NATO GUIDANCE IN ANSWERING EASTERN QUESTIONS ALONG THESE LINES. HOWEVER, HE HAS SINCE CLAIMED THAT HE CONSIDERES WHAT HE SAID TO HAVE BEEN THE ONLY POSSIBLE CONCLUSION WHICH COULD BE

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DRAWN FROM EXISTING NATO GUIDANCE. HE MAINTAINS THAT, SINCE EXISITING GUIDANCE (PARA 34 OF CM 73(83) STATES THAT THE ALLIES WILL WISH TO RESERVE TO THEMSELVES DECISION ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF PHASE II REDUCTIONS, EAST-WEST BARGAINING OVER THE AMOUNT OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY REDUCTION COMMITMENT MUST BE COLLECTIVE ONLY. OTHER ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES HAVE POINTED OUT THAT THIS WAS NOT THE SOLE POSSIBLE CONCLUSION TO BE DRAWN FROM EXISTING NATO GUIDANCE AND THAT THE GUIDANCE CONTAINED NO SUCH CONCLUSION. MOREOVER, THE GUIDANCE ALSO EXPRESSLY PROVIDES THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD SEEK FURTHER SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II.

12. ALL AHG REPS EXCEPT THE FRG AND ITALIAN REPS AGREED DURING THE AD HOC GROUP DISCUSSION THAT THE FIRST COURSE (16A) WOULD MAKE THE WESTERN POSITION EVEN LESS NEGOTIABLE WITH THE EAST THAN IT NOW IS. PRIVATELY, FRG REP AGREES WITH THIS ASSESSMENT ALSO. HOWEVER, COURSE 16A IS IN CONFORMITY WITH THE FEDERAL GERMAN DESIRE THAT THE WESTERN REDUCTION COMMITMENT IN PHASE II BE OF A COLLECTIVE NATURE AND THAT THE WEST NOT BARGAIN WITH THE EAST OVER INDIVIDUAL WESTERN REDUCTIONS. THE GERMANS WANT THE COMMITMENT TO BE COLLECTIVE NOT ONLY TO PROTECT THE COLLECTIVE CEILING, BUT AS A GOAL IN ITSELF, TO PROTECT THE FRG AGAINST POSSIBLE LATER SOVIET PRESSURES FOLLOWING AN AGREEMENT BY MAKING THE FRG A MEMBER OF A CORPORATE GROUP UNDERTAKING A JOINT COMMITMENT.

13. WE UNDERSTAND THIS FRG MOTIVATION, BUT QUESTION ITS NEGOTIATING FEASIBILITY. THIS APPROACH WOULD RUN DIRECTLY COUNTER TO THE EASTERN POSITION, HELD FROM THE OUTSET OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THAT OBLIGATIONS CANNOT BE UNDERTAKEN BY ALLIANCES, BUT ONLY BY PARTICIPATING STATES, AND THAT ALL REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS SHOULD BE OF THE SAME QUALITY. THIS MEANS THAT, IF THE WEST INSISTS THAT PHASE II REDUCTION COMMITMENTS BE COLLECTIVE, THE EAST WOULD NOT ONLY CONTINUE TO REJECT PHASING AS SUCH, BUT ARGUE IN ADDITION WITH REGARD TO THE WESTERN PHASE I PROGRAM THAT THE USSR WILL ENTER ON ONLY THE SAME TYPE OF COMMITMENTS THAT OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ARE PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE.

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14. BUT EVEN IF THE EAST DID AGREE TO THE WESTERN REQUIREMENT THAT WESTERN PHASE II REDUCTION COMMITMENTS BE COLLECTIVE, THE ALLIES WOULD FACE AN ADDITIONAL PROBLEM REGARDING SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II. ANY REDUCTION COMMITMENTS IN MBFR WILL HAVE TO BE RECIPROCAL. THE WEST CANNOT CLAIM A RIGHT FOR ITSELF IT IS UNWILLING TO EXTEND TO THE EAST. BUT THE WEST WISHES FURTHER SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II AND THESE REDUCTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE ON THE BASIS OF A SPECIFIC COMMITMENT BY THE USSR TO REDUCE A SPECIFIED NUMBER OF FORCES. IF THE EASTERN PHASE II COMMITMENT IS SOLELY COLLECTIVE, THE SOVIETS WOULD BE FREE TO TAKE ONLY A FEW REDUCTIONS AND THE REMAINDER OF THE AGREED PACT REDUCTION TOTAL COULD BE IN EASTERN EUROPEAN FORCES. THIS APPROACH WOULD ALSO MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH OR CONTINUE A TREATY BARRIER AGAINST AN INCREASE IN SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

15. THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE WAY OF MODIFYING THE CURRENT ALLIED POSITION (PARA 16 B OF MBFR VIENNA 276) AVOIDS TAKING ANY POSITION ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER PHASE II REDUCTION COMMITMENTS WILL BE EITHER COLLECTIVE OR INDIVIDUAL. IT MAY BE MORE NEGOTIABLE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE FOR THAT REASON. BUT IT DOES ANSWER THE BROADER EASTERN QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE EAST WOULD KNOW AMOUNTS OF REDUCTIONS BY INDIVIDUAL WESTERN PARTICIPANTS PRIOR TO SIGNING PHASE II AGREEMENT. UNDER COURSE B, THE ALLIES WOULD DECLINE TO DISCUSS THE NATURE OF PHASE II REDUCTION COMMITMENTS AT THIS STAGE. THEY WOULD, HOWEVER, SAY THAT -- PROVIDED THE EAST AGREE TO A COLLECTIVE COMMON CEILING -- EACH SIDE WOULD INFORM THE OTHER BEFORE SIGNATURE OF AN AGREEMENT HOW IT INTENDED TO DISTRIBUTE ITS TOTAL REDUCTION. THIS MEANS, IN EFFECT, THAT THE SIZE OF THE REDUCTIONS BY INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES COULD BE THE SUBJECT OF BARGAINING, EVEN THOUGH THE ISSUE OF WHETHER REDUCTION COMMITMENTS WOULD BE INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE IS DELIBERATELY LEFT OPEN.

16. ALTHOUGH THE EASTERN OBJECTIVE IS CLEARLY TO BRING
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THE WEST TO COMMIT ITSELF FROM THE OUTSET AS TO THE AMOUNT OF PHASE II REDUCTIONS BY INDIVIDUAL WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, COURSE B WOULD GIVE THE WEST A

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

RESONABLE POSITION TO HOLD AGAINST THIS DEMAND.

17. FOR THESE REASONS, WE COULD LIVE WITH COURSE B AS AN INTERIM MEASURE, THOUGH IT IS NOT OUR PREFERRED COURSE. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A POSSIBLE NAC GUIDANCE ON COURSE B FOR CONSIDERATION:

BEGIN TEXT: IN REPLY TO EASTERN QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER EACH WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANT WOULD SPECIFY THE AMOUNT OF ITS REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II,

ALLIED NEGOTIATORS ARE AUTHORIZED TO STATE THAT,
UNDER THE WESTERN REDUCTION APPROACH, THE NUMBER
OF REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY EACH
WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANT IN PHASE II WOULD BE
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MADE KNOWN TO THE OTHER SIDE PRIOR TO SIGNATURE
OF A PHASE II AGREEMENT, PROVIDED THAT IT IS ALSO
AGREED IN PHASE II THAT, EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF
THE US AND USSR, THE ONLY LIMITATION ON GROUND
FORCE MANPOWER WHICH WILL CONTINUE AFTER PHASE II
REDUCTIONS HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED WILL BE OF A
COLLECTIVE NATURE, APPLYING TO THE TOTAL MANPOWER
OF EACH SIDE IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS FOLLOWING
IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREED REDUCTIONS. WESTERN
PARTICIPANTS WOULD ALSO BE PREPARED TO COMMIT
THEMSELVES IN A PHASE II AGREEMENT TO IMPLEMENT
AGREED REDUCTIONS WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME.
ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD TELL THE EAST THAT
THEY ARE NOT PREPARED TO BE MORE SPECIFIC ABOUT
PHASE II COMMITMENTS AT THIS TIME. END TEXT.

18. THE DELEGATION CONSIDERS THAT THE THIRD ALTERNATIVE
COURSE OF ACTION LISTED BY THE AD HOC GROUP (PARA 16 C OF
MBFR VIENNA 276) WOULD BEST SERVE THE ALLIED PURPOSE OF
GAINING EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE WESTERN TWO-PHASED
APPROACH. IT WOULD MEET THE EASTERN REQUIREMENT THAT
EACH PARTICIPANT OBLIGATE ITSELF TO REDUCE BY A SPECIFIC
AMOUNT. AT THE SAME TIME, THIS POSITION FULLY PROTECTS
THE WESTERN POSITION ON THE COLLECTIVE CEILING, BY MAKING
INDIVIDUAL NUMERICAL REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS BY EACH
PARTICIPANT IN PHASE II CONDITIONAL ON EASTERN AGREEMENT
TO A COLLECTIVE COMMON CEILING. IT WOULD ALSO BEST SERVE
WESTERN INTEREST IN GETTING A COMMITMENT FROM THE SOVIETS
IN PHASE II TO REDUCE A SPECIFIC NUMBER OF THEIR FORCES.
MOREOVER, IT TAKES ADVANTAGE OF STATEMENTS BY SOVIET REP
KHLESTOV IN BOTH THE JUNE 3 AND JUNE 10 INFORMAL SESSIONS
THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH REDUCTION COMMITMENTS
FROM OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING RESIDUAL CEILINGS, AND TO
TREAT THE TWO ISSUES SEPARATELY. WE BELIEVE THAT KHLESTOV'S
POINT IS CORRECT. IT IS A POINT WHICH THE WEST SHOULD
PRESERVE IF IT IS TO BE SUCCESSFUL IN MOVING THE EAST
TOWARD ACCEPTANCE OF A COLLECTIVE CEILING.

19. ALTHOUGH BOTH UK AND FRG REPS PERSONALLY BELIEVE THAT THE
WEST WILL HAVE TO COME TO THIS POSITION EVENTUALLY,
THEY DO NOT CONSIDER THAT THERE IS ANY CHANCE OF THEIR
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GOVERNMENTS AGREEING TO ADVANCE THIS POSITION TO THE EAST NOW. CONSEQUENTLY, THE UK REP PERSONALLY STRONGLY FAVORS COURSE B.

20. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE RECOMMEND THAT THE USG TAKE THE POSITION THAT:

- A) THE ALLIES CANNOT STAND PAT ON THE PRESENT POSITION AND HAVE AN EFFECTIVE POSITION ON PHASING.
- B) COURSE A OF THE AD HOC GROUP REPORT IS NOT A FEASIBLE OPTION BECAUSE THE EAST HAS ALREADY REJECTED ITS SUBSTANCE.
- C) COURSE C WOULD ADEQUATELY PROTECT ALLIES' INTERESTS AND IS A REALISTIC OUTCOME.

21. IF IT IS EVIDENT AFTER DISCUSSION IN THE NAC THAT THERE IS NO CONSENSUS FOR COURSE C, THE US COULD EXPRESS THE VIEW THAT COURSE B IS A VIABLE INTERIM COURSE. IF IT SHOULD PROVE NECESSARY TO FALL BACK TO THIS COURSE, THEN WE RECOMMEND TABLING IN THE NAC LANGUAGE ALONG THE LINES OF TEXT PROPOSED IN PARA 16 ABOVE. RESOR

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